Technology is always required in elections. The days of the hand-counted ballots are over. You can design technology in a way that makes the problems readily apparent or that they're disguised. My position is that when a problem is found, it's an engineering problem.
I don't mean by that that it will necessarily at any stage be compulsory to vote in that way, but I think that the notion that, if it can be established as secure and reliable, people should have the option to vote online, will gain ground more and more and more.
On one hand, there are parties that have lagged behind in technology, either they cannot understand or are purposely spreading lies. They have opposed all subjects in technology — EVM, Aadhaar card, mobile phone, every where.
In addition to having a really secure personal identification system, which is a physical card, and two codes – I think, frankly, it's slightly stronger than somebody opening my passport with my photo that is six years old.
We have made the system even stronger by the fact that e-voting lasts several days.
On balance, internet voting is feasible, which if effectively deployed, could improve accessibility for voters, especially those that are overseas and others for whom access is an issue, such as the disabled. It could also potentially save costs and time.
Smartmatic CEO and member of SGO, investing in Democracy, E-voting, Privacy and Identity, and
The reason to bring technology into the election process is to increase integrity and security, but it has a series of important collateral benefits.
One is cost reduction: so I’m sure Britain could spend less per election if it was using technology, and the security and integrity would be 10 to a hundredfold better. So you have something that’s a hundredfold better, and it’s going to cost less...See More
The way I look at things is: How many people have to conspire to steal an election now? With paper ballots at polling places, to steal a significant number of votes, you’d have to have lots of poll workers or a lot of voters voting fraudulently, which would be very difficult and expensive. And with paperless touchscreen voting you maybe need a few programmers. If you had widespread Internet voting...See More
We have learned the hard way that almost any computer system can be broken into by a sufficiently determined, skillful, and persistent adversary. There is nothing special about voting systems that magically provides protection against attack...
Voting system software may be maliciously designed, may contain bugs, or may be changed or replaced at some point during the pre-election roll-out of eq...See More
Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist and author. Described by T
Today, we conduct our elections on computers. Our registration lists are in computer databases. We vote on computerized voting machines. And our tabulation and reporting is done on computers. We do this for a lot of good reasons, but a side effect is that elections now have all the insecurities inherent in computers. The only way to reliably protect elections from both malice and accident is to us...See More
Law Professor & Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law @uocommonlaw @uOttawaTech
While technology may someday allow us to replicate these essential features online, many of them are currently absent from Internet voting, which is subject to any number of possible disruptions. These include denial of service attacks that shut down the election process, counterfeit websites, phishing attacks, hacks into the election system, or the insertion of computer viruses that tamper with e...See More
Scientist, safecracker, professor, writer. 280 is the new 140 is the new 1536.
Few, if any, state and local IT departments are equipped to protect this infrastructure against the full force of a hostile intelligence service, and these systems are very attractive targets for disruption.
I'm a hack and pundit. I appear on Click on BBC World Service radio. Helping design a future B
I do not think it is possible to design an e-voting system that can be guaranteed secure against a concerted and well-funded attack.
I am concerned that this will happen, or worse, that it will be suspected and that the results of an election will be cast into doubt.
Robert E. Kahn Professor of Computer Science & Public Affairs @Princeton. Formerly Deputy U.S.
If there is uncertainty after an election, either because of the possibility of tampering or just the possibility of error or malfunction, a paperless system like Georgia’s doesn’t have any way to go back to other evidence to figure out what really happened.